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FOREWORD
NEW ERA, NEW THREATS: WRESTLING
WITH INTERSTITIAL ACTORS
Joshua A. Levy*
A NOTE FROM THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY ("THE STANDING
COMMITTEE"): The Standing Committee assisted the Michigan
Journal of International Law with the organization of its symposium
entitled, "Post-Cold War International Security Threats: Terrorism,
Drugs, and Organized Crime," and takes great pleasure in
distributing the transcripts and articles from the symposium
proceedings to members of the international security law community
worldwide. This symposium is the first of its kind not only in terms of
its content, but also in terms of its vision demonstrated by the students
who took it upon themselves to bring the issues that intersect law and
national security to a public discourse. We are delighted to have
participated in this landmark event and hope, through the distribution
of these materials and continued dialogue, that we remain involved in
promoting its legacy.
With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, global foreign relations
devolved from a bipolar "stability" between two superpowers to a single
hegemon, struggling to define itself. Prior to 1991, security threats were
largely comprised of state versus state conflicts. Today, however, sig-
nificant security threats derive from "interstitial actors," those entities
who-aspirations notwithstanding-neither represent nor claim to repre-
sent an internationally recognized nation-state, yet whose reach and
sophistication resemble a nation-state (e.g., drug barons, Hamas, Cosa
Nostra).' The factional implosion of the Balkans and the African Great
Lakes region tragically illustrate this development.
* Law clerk for the Honorable Joan A. Lenard, United States District Court Judge for
the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division; B.A. 1994, Columbia College, Columbia
University; J.D. 1999, University of Michigan Law School; Masters of International Affairs
1999, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs; Editor-in-Chief of the
Michigan Journal of International Law, volume 20. I thank Eric Feilier, Catherine Jones,
Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, Maureen Bishop, Hiram Chodosh, the volume 20 MJIL editors,
and the symposium's sponsors, all of whom made the February 1999 Symposium possible.
1. See Symposium Proposal of the Michigan Journal of International Law (January 11,
1999) [hereinafter Proposal] (quoting an April 1, 1998 telephone interview with Elizabeth
Rindskopf, former General Counsel of the CIA) (on file with the Michigan Journal of Inter-
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Powerful interstitial actors are not new to global affairs. In fact,
their prior historical impact is exactly what concerns policymakers and
their legal advisers world-wide. One need only recall the Roman empire,
its losses to the Huns, and its ultimate sacking by the Vandals in order to
recognize the security dilemma, which interstitial actors pose for states
and, yes, empires. The very success of the Huns and Vandals against the
Roman Empire came from their ability to turn the rules of war and di-
plomacy on their head.3 The Romans had no experience negotiating
with, let alone fighting against, tribes. By the time the Romans devel-
oped a method of addressing these tribal threats, it was too late.
Threats from modern interstitial actors have proven equally per-
plexing for today's policymakers.4 In August 1998, Osama bin Laden
orchestrated the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania. How to respond to this act perplexed the policymakers in
Washington. In fact, the decision by the Clinton administration to retali-
ate against bin Laden by, inter alia, bombing an alleged dual use
national Law). Quoting the Proposal, Professor Phillip Nichols correctly notes that
"multinational corporations, international financial institutions, international organizations,
and many other legitimate entities fit into [Rindskopf s] definition of interstitial actors." Philip
M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International
Policy Goal under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? Increasing Global
Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 451,469 (1999).
2. See Douglas Kash, The 21st Century Pirate: Modernity of an Ancient Scourge, 22
A.B.A. NAT'L SEC. L. REPORT 1 (2000) (explaining that "pirate attacks against large ships
have doubled during the 1990s to approximately 300 per year"). Today's maritime pirates are
not state-sponsored, but "consist[] of well-organized bands of trained mercenaries typically
working on behalf of international crime syndicates." Kash, supra, at 4.
3. Referring to Genseric, King of the Vandals, Edward Gibbon wrote, "The designs of
Roman government were repeatedly baffled by his artful delays, ambiguous promises, and
apparent concessions .. " EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE
591 (8th ed. 1974). Being "more ambitious of spoil than of glory, [the Vandals] seldom at-
tacked any fortified cities or engaged any regular troops in the open field." Id. at 601.
4. Introducing an analysis of how to respond "proportionately" to terrorism, Professor
Ruth Wedgwood described the challenges involved in addressing threats from "modem" ter-
rorists,
Modem terrorism has salient differences from traditional warfare. The actors are
often not states, but rather ideological, political, or ethnic factions. States have a
host of international commitments and aspirations that create an incentive to avoid
all-out warfare and to avoid undermining the rules of war, while a single-purpose
terrorist organization may operate without mitigation. A terrorist group often cal-
culates that it will win attention for its cause and undermine a target government by
the very atrocity of its tactics. A terrorist group is less vulnerable to international
sanctions, as it does not possess a visible economy, land area, or identified popula-
tion. With an uncertain membership and inchoate form, terrorist networks lie
outside the web of civil responsibility that constrains private and public actors in
international society.
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes against Bin Laden, 24 YALE J. INT'L
L. 559, 559 (1999).
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pharmaceutical facility in Sudan has been criticized for its lack of pro-
portionality and reliance on faulty intelligence Though reliance on
faulty intelligence presents its own unique problems, determining what a
proportional, appropriate, and effective response to interstitial actors
generates difficult overlapping strategic and legal questions.
Imperative then today is discussion, study, and coordination among
the many states threatened by interstitial actors. This sort of dialogue is
precisely what The Michigan Journal of International Law sought to
continue in its symposium, entitled, "Post Cold War International Secu-
rity Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, and Organized Crime," held February
19-20, 2000, at the University of Michigan Law School. There, over
thirty of the most active minds working in international security law ex-
changed their views with the general public on this topic. The Michigan
Journal of International Law found it fitting to hold such a dialogue in
Ann Arbor because in 1971 that city witnessed the first-ever prosecuted
terrorist attack on U.S. soil-an attempted bombing of the Federal
Building. In that case (the "Keith case"), the United States Supreme
Court decided that despite the national security implications of the
crime, the government's interest in national security did not outweigh
the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendants, each of whom were
U.S. citizens. Though the case left the question open for similarly situ-
ated foreign defendants,7 the Keith court's message is clear: why
maintain national security, if we undermine those liberties which we
seek to secure?
Though the issues in Keith were apparently the first of their kind
raised before the federal judiciary,8 they are not the last. Law's intersec-
tion with national security presents new questions in this post-Cold War
world. Most of these questions demand not a single country's attention,
but many. For example, the PKK's raid last year on an Israeli embassy,
located in Germany, in retaliation for Israel's involvement in arresting
Ocalan implicated the interests of the EU, Israel, Germany, and Turkey.9
This scenario demands law enforcement and intelligence of each country
to enter the scene, share information, and gather information (evidence)
5. See id. at 570-71 (disputing use of soil sample taken by agent inside gates at Khar-
toum plant).
6. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S. Ct. 2125, 32
L.Ed.2d 752 (1972) [hereinafter the Keith case].
7. See id. at 322 n. 20 (finding warrantless surveillance may be constitutional where se-
curity threatened by foreign power).
8. See id. at 299.
9. See Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in Europe: Reconsidering the Luxem-
bourg Exclusion, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 606, 611 (2000) (discussing Turkey's animosity
toward EU because of its handling of capture of known Kurdish terrorist, Abdullah Ocalan).
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in an attempt to arrest and prosecute the crime's perpetrators.' ° But,
which country should accomplish such efforts? In which country's court
should the case be tried? Which law should be applied? Moreover, or-
ganized financial crimes present even more complex questions,
especially when money is stolen from one country and laundered in sev-
eral more, such as the BCCI scandal."
Solutions to these problems on the front and back ends are long
overdue. As the reader will note, packed within the following sympo-
sium transcript are creative solutions and poignant questions. The
Michigan Journal of International Law is grateful to those speakers who
presented papers and participated in panel discussions that enriched this
critical dialogue.
The symposium broke into two days. The first day concentrated on
the definitions of the aforementioned threats. Panel discussions on that
day included: Challenges from Interstitial Actors and Their Crimes;
How Can Terrorism Be Defined?; Financial Aspects of Terrorism; De-
fining Drug Trafficking as a National Security Threat; Asylum Law and
the Extradition of Terrorists; and a keynote address by Ambassador An-
thony Quainton.
The second day of the symposium reviewed, in the main, how policy
makers and their legal counsel should address these threats from inter-
stitial actors. Panel discussions for that day are entitled: Law
Enforcement and Gathering Evidence; Rendition of Foreign Criminals
from Foreign Soil; Weapons of Mass Destruction as Implements of Ter-
rorism; Prosecuting and Defending a Foreign Criminal; and International
Criminal Court.
Hopefully, the symposium will spark meaningful action toward cre-
ating such desperately needed solutions in the intersecting fields of law
and national security policy as well as the study of international security
law in law schools world-wide. Without such education, continued dia-
logue, and action, we mark the beginning of the end. With them,
however, this world may continue on its road toward becoming a collec-
tion of secure democracies, held fast by the rule of law.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Rindskopf & Joshua A. Levy, Law Enforcement and Intelligence:
No Longer Ships Passing in the Night, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. - (forthcoming 2000); Ethan
A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the International Enforcement of Criminal
Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 37, 74 (1990).
11. See Phyllis Solomon, Are Money Launderers All Washed up in the Western Hemi-
sphere? The OAS Model Regulations, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 433, 437 (1994)
(summarizing BCCI case).
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